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Real and Imagined Effects of Statutes
Restricting the Liability of
Nonmanufacturing Sellers of Defective
Products
John G. Culhane*
I. Introduction
The liability of nonmanufacturing sellers' of defective products
has long occupied a peculiar place in product liability law. On the
one hand, the negligence origin of product liability law,2 which has
never been completely submerged, suggests that those who do not
manufacture products should not ordinarily be responsible for defects caused by the manufacturer. On the other hand, concern with
compensating victims injured by mass-produced products may make
a nonmanufacturing supplier an attractive liability target.'
* Assistant Professor of Law, Widener University School of Law. B.A., College of William and Mary, 1978; J.D., Fordham University, 1982.
1 am greatly indebted to my research assistants, Marc Auerbach, Neal Glenn, Marianne
Gaul, and Jeffrey O'Hara, all of whom contributed valuable insights and dedication. Thanks
also to my colleagues, Alan Garfield, Barry R. Furrow, and Martin Kotler for their helpful
comments and suggestions, and for their encouragement.
1. This Article uses the terms "nonmanufacturing seller" and "supplier" interchangeably to refer to those who sell, but do not manufacture, products. Suppliers who have a hand in
redesigning or somehow altering a product do not satisfy the definition of nonmanufacturing
seller or supplier but probably do satisfy the definition of manufacturers, and thus would be
subject to liability rules affecting manufacturers. See, e.g., MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACT § 105(A) (1979), which provides: "In determining whether a product seller, other
than a manufacturer, is subject to liability . . .the trier of fact shall consider the effect of
such product seller's own conduct with respect to the design, construction, inspection, or condition of the product ....
2. The tenacity of negligence law is evident at every turn. Both design defect and failure
to warn liability incorporate some sort of a negligence analysis. See infra notes 82-125 and
accompanying text. Even regarding liability for simple manufacturing defects, courts have
been hesitant to find liable suppliers who serve as "mere conduits" in the chain of distribution.
See, e.g., Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 468, 150 P.2d 436, 443-44 (1944);
Sam Shainberg Co. v. Barlow, 258 So. 2d 242 (Miss. 1972). See also Leete, Products Liability for Non-manufacturer Product Sellers: Is it Time to Draw the Line?," 17 FORUM 1250
(1982); Gravico, The Strict Tort Liability-of Retailers, Wholesalers, and Distributors of Defective Products, 12 NOVA L. REV. 213 (1987).
3. This concern with compensating the victim of a defective product is most evident in
the saving provisions of most state product liability statutes. These statutes initially relieve the
supplier of liability absent negligence, but then permit the injured party to recover against the
supplier when the manufacturer is either insolvent or not amenable to jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-402 (West 1989); IDAHO CODE § 6-1407 (Michie Supp. 1989); ILL.
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Until quite recently, the courts' approach to product liability
law reflected the tension between holding liable only the negligent
manufacturer and expanding the class of defendants responsible in
order to compensate fully the injured party. The courts held suppliers strictly liable for injuries caused by the defective products they
sold, but permitted suppliers to seek indemnification against the
manufacturer who created the defect.' But increased concern about
the. proliferation and cost of product liability suits has recently
spurred many states to enact legislation that in various ways limits

nonmanufacturers' liability.5
This Article canvasses recent statutory and judicial developments in supplier liability law, with an eye towards determining both
the substantive and practical impact of those developments on suppliers. Part II provides a brief, historical treatment of product liability doctrine, with an emphasis on the relation between the general
ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-621 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990); IOWA CODE ANN. § 613.18 (West
Supp. 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3306 (1983); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.340 (Michie/
Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1990); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-311 (1984); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 544.41 (West 1990); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.762 (Vernon 1990); NC. GEN. STAT. § 99
B-2 (1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.78 (Banks-Baldwin Supp. 1989); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 29-28-106 (Supp. 1990); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.72.040 (West Supp. 1990).
A few jurisdictions have statutes that do not hold the supplier liable absent some showing
of independent fault, even when the manufacturer cannot be reached. See, e.g., GA. CODE
ANN. § 51-1 -11.1 (Supp. 1989); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 20-9-9 (Supp. 1990).
4. See, e.g., Smith v. Fiat-Roosevelt Motors, Inc., 556 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1977), which
acknowledged the strength of arguments against holding retailers liable for defects created by
manufacturers, but then stated:
[T]he risk that goods sold are not reasonably fit is to fall, not on the consumer,
but on those who make and sell them. Remedies looking up the line of distribution and fabrication afford the vendor such recourse as he has and, to the extent
they are effective, ameliorate the ... unfairness.
Id. at 732. See also Vandemark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 262, 391 P.2d 168, 171,
37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 899 (1964).
5. The liability insurance crisis has generally been held responsible for the emergence of
statutes relieving the supplier of liability. Two commentators explain:
In the mid-1970s, property and casualty insurers decreed sharp increases in
product-liability insurance premiums and thereby provoked what has become
known as the product-liability 'Crisis.' The manufacturers who had to pay these
premiums as well as the insurers who charged them put a lion's share of the
blame upon state-court decisions . . . which have expanded the ambit of liability
for the benefit of persons claiming injury from defective products, and upon the
excessive jury verdicts which these liberalized tort doctrines had facilitated.
Page & Stephens, The Product Liability Insurance 'Crisis:' Causes, Nostrums and Cures, 13
CAP. U.L. REV. 387, 387 (1984). For a comprehensive discussion of the crisis, see Berger, The
Impact of Tort Law Development on Insurance: The Availability/Affordability Crisis and its
Potential Solutions, 37 AM. U.L. REV. 285 (1988). Berger blames much of the "crisis" on the
unpredictability and expansion of tort law, and provides thoughtful suggestions on how to improve the situation. Berger recommends more active regulatory oversight, changes in the contingency fee system, caps on punitive damages, and clear tort standards of liability as productive areas of reform. Id. at 318-21. See also Abraham, Making Sense of the Liability
Insurance Crisis, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 399 (1987), in which Abraham argues that both the underwriting cycle and insurers' own strategies have also played a role in the crisis.
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flowering of this area of the law and the more specific evolution of
supplier liability. 6 The section concludes with a wide-angle look at
recent supplier liability statutes, which mix codification of decisional
law and genuine reform.
The Article then turns to consideration of the impact of such
statutes on various types of product liability cases. Part III treats the
effect that the various types of supplier liability statutes have had,
and may be expected to have, in cases involving simple manufacturing defects.' Finally, Part IV considers the effect that these laws
have on the closely related issues of design defect and failure to

warn.8

II. Development of Product and Supplier Liability Law
Product liability law originally required the plaintiff to show the
defendant's negligence. Judge Cardozo's opinion for the New York
Court of Appeals in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.9 is famous for
its abolition of the privity requirement, but the case is also noteworthy for its adherence to the fault principle.1" In MacPherson, the car
manufacturer could be liable only if it had failed to use reasonable
care in inspecting the tires supplied by a component manufacturer.
This insistence upon a showing of negligence is not surprising, since
tort law was primarily a fault-based system with discrete pockets of
strict liability."
6. See infra notes 9-48 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 51-80 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 81-125 and accompanying text.
9. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
10. The privity rule limited recovery for injuries caused by defective products to parties
who had been in a contractual relation with defendant. Although recognizing that courts had
developed exceptions to the privity rule, Huset v. J.I. Cage Threshing Machine Co., 120 F. 864
(8th Cir. 1903) nonetheless reaffirmed the rule:
[T]he liability of the contractor or manufacturer for negligence in the construction or sale of the articles which he makes or vends is limited to the persons to
whom he is liable under his contracts of construction or sale. The limits of the
liability for negligence and for breaches of contract in cases of this character are
held to be identical.
Id. at 867.
Judge Cardozo's landmark decision in McPherson emphasized causation and the obvious
dangers posed by a defective product:
There is here no break in the chain of cause and effect. In such circumstances,
the presence of a known danger, attendant upon a known use, makes vigilance a
duty. We have put aside the notion that the duty to safeguard life and limb,
when the consequences of negligence may be foreseen, grows out of contract and
nothing else. We have put the source of the obligation where it ought to be. We
have put its source in the law.
217 N.Y. at 390, 111 N.E. at 1053.
11. See generally Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory. 85 HARv. L. REV. 537
(1972); Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. REV. 359, 382-84
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Negligence, however, is notoriously difficult to prove in defective
product cases. Typically, the manufacturer will have better access to
inspection records and quality control information. 12 Further, inspection and quality control may meet the "reasonable person" standard,
since no manufacturing process is, or can be, made foolproof. 3
Showing that the product was defective at all, or that the defect was
present when the product left the manufacturer, can also be
problematic. 4
To ease plaintiffs' burden, courts turned to devices that, with
the benefit of hindsight, were little more than expedients. First,
courts began to rely on the law of implied warranty, which imposes
strict liability upon the seller of a product. 16 Warranty theory, a
mixture of tort and contract principles, 6 requires the seller to produce a product free of injury-causing defects. 17 The problem re(1951).
12. See Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REV.
1258, 1258 (1976); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 886 (Alaska 1979).
5.02[l] (1987): "The general
13. See M. SHAPO, THE LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY
standard for negligence liability is that of a reasonably prudent person who produces or sells a
particular product."
14. Initially, it may seem odd to yoke defect to negligence. But showing that defendant
manufacturer's process was negligent may assist plaintiff's attempt to show that a product was
defective. A negligent operation presumably leads to more defects than a careful one. But
identifying the causal link between the defect and the injury is equally difficult under all
theories.
[T]he plaintiff has to establish the causal connection between the product's defect and his injury. This last task is almost always difficult, because the damage
suffered is never the direct and immediate consequence of the defendant's conduct, as it is in cases of trespass. Instead, the plaintiff must painfully trace his
way from the original defect to his ultimate harm through the use and possible
abuse of the product either by himself or third parties, all without running afoul
of the limitations on remoteness of damage.
R. EPSTEIN. C. GREGORY & B. KALVEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS, at 638 (4th ed.
1984).
15. The law of implied warranty developed in response to early product liability decisions that refused to impose strict liability upon the seller of a defective product. Under implied warranty, the seller of a defective product is held strictly liable to the consumer by virtue
of the sale. There are today several implied warranties as to consumer goods. The most important of these is the implied warranty of merchantability, U.C.C. § 2-314, by which the seller
impliedly warrants the product's fitness for ordinary use. In addition, a seller is held to guarantee that its product is fit for a particular use when the consumer, with the seller's knowledge,
relies upon the seller's representation as to that use. U.C.C. § 2-315. See PROSSER & KEETON,
THE LAW OF TORTS § 95A (5th ed. 1984).
16. Although the point is not beyond dispute, the fluidity with which courts have moved
back and forth between tort and contract principles in interpreting rights under warranties
may be attributed to dissatisfaction with the result obtained under one theory or the other. See
generally PROSSER AND Keeton on The Law of Torts, §§ 98-99 (W. Keeton 5th ed. 1984).
17. At first blush, it may seem strange to apply the warranty attending sale of a good to
a personal injury action. Why not use the warranty action to address consumer dissatisfaction
with the product, as by requiring the seller to replace or repair, leaving the tort action to
physical damage - personal injury and property damage - caused by a defective product?
See R. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS (5th ed. 1990). Epstein suggested that
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mained, however, that implied warranty claims' 8 would only lie
against the injured plaintiff's immediate seller because actions based
on breach of warranty continued to require privity. 19

Meanwhile, within the walls of negligence itself, courts were
turning to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to allow plaintiffs to

reach the jury on the issue of product defect. 20 The application of res
courts apply the warranty action to claims of consumer dissatisfaction with the product and
apply the tort action to physical damage, including personal injury and property damage,
caused by the defective product. Id. at 632. Despite the appeal of this bifurcated system,
courts have continued to apply warranty theory to claims for physical damage. See, e.g., McCabe v. L.K. Liggett Drug Co., 330 Mass. 177, 112 N.E.2d 254 (1953). The perceived inadequacies of the tort remedy, which long required the plaintiff to demonstrate that defendant
had been negligent, explains why courts continued to apply warranty theory to claims for
physical damage.
18. The notion that the manufacture of a defective good breached an implied warranty
first surfaced in cases involving defective foodstuffs. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS, supra note 16, § 97, at 690-92.
19. The privity requirement in warranty cases was consistent with the nature of the
cause of action: Plaintiff was suing the entity with whom he or she had been in a contract of
sale. As Prosser and Keeton have stated, "[w]arranties on the sale of goods were governed in
most states by the Uniform Sales Act, and then by its successor, the Uniform Commercial
Code; and neither of these statutes had been drawn with anything in mind but a contract
between a 'seller' and his immediate 'buyer'." Id. at 691. Courts and commentators have generally regarded Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), as
the landmark case that overturned the privity requirement for actions sounding in implied
warranty. See Prosser, The Fall of The Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN.
L. REv. 791 (1966). Henningsen has receded in importance as the more suitable principles of
strict liability have trumped implied warranty. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,
Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962), which confronted the problem of
theoretical fit. The court stated that
strict liability has usually been based on the theory of an express or implied
warranty running from the manufacturer to the plaintiff, [but] the abandonment
of the requirement of a contract between them, the recognition that the liability
is not assumed by agreement but imposed by law, and the refusal to permit the
manufacturer to define the scope of its own responsibility for defective products
make clear that the liability is not one governed by the law of contract warranties but by the law of strict liability in tort.
Id. at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701 (citations omitted).
20. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur enables an injured party to reach the jury with
nothing more than circumstantial evidence. Under the doctrine's most accepted formulation,
the following conditions are necessary: (1) the event must be one that would not ordinarily
occur without someone's negligence; (2) the accident must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within the defendant's exclusive control; and (3) plaintiff must be without voluntary

action or contribution in causing the accident.

PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS,

supra note 16, § 39 at 244. Although the doctrine's unsuitability in many products liability
cases seems clear, res ipsa loquitur also has more general drawbacks. As one judge has stated:
"It adds nothing to the law, has no meaning which is not more clearly expressed . . . in

English, and brings confusion to our legal discussions."

PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF

supra note 16, at 244 n.20, quoting Potomac Edison Co. v. Johnson, 160 Md. 33, 152
A. 633 (1930) (Bond, C.J., dissenting).
Res ipsa loquitur will apply principally to cases involving manufacturing defects since
demonstrating what went wrong in those cases is usually difficult. In contrast, res ipsa loquitur
cannot apply to a determination of design defect because it involves a finding that all units of a
particular product are identical and inadequate. See Dickerson, The ABC's of Products Liability - With a Close Look at Section 402A and the Code, 36 TENN. L. REV. 439, 441
(1969).
TORTS,
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ipsa loquitur to product liability cases was "heroic and tortured,"
however, because the exclusive control requirement could never be
met; the product was always out of defendant's hands and often had
passed through several other entities before reaching plaintiff. 21 Further, courts relaxed the requirement that the accident be one that
does not typically occur absent some negligence. 22 Judicial willingness so to attenuate negligence doctrine suggested that acceptance of
faultless liability was not far behind. 3
Courts eventually stopped shuffling between inadequate theories
and began to impose strict liability in tort on all parties within the
chain of distribution - including manufacturers, wholesalers, distributors, and retailers. 24 The imposition of strict liability, foretold
by Justice
Traynor's concurrence in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling
Co., 2 5 reflected a profound change in judicial and societal attitudes,
and was justified by a number of rationales: (1) those who massproduce consumer goods are best able to absorb the cost of injuries
associated with those goods since they can pass those costs on to consumers; (2) placing liability on manufacturers without fault increases the incentive for manufacturers to produce safer products;
(3) requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate defendant's negligence in
causing the defect imposes an intolerably high evidentiary burden;
21.

This phrase is shamelessly cribbed from R.

EPSTEIN,

C.

GREGORY

& B. KALVEN,

CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS at 640 (4th ed. 1984), where it was used to summarize the
California Supreme Court's use of res ipsa loquitur in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24
Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1949). It is understandable why the court decided to focus on the
control issue at the time of the negligence, rather than at the time of the accident; it is not
understandable why the court disparately treated the manufacturer's evidence concerning
quality control, and the bottler's evidence on the same issue.
22. Again, Escola provides a good example of the courts' increased willingness to bend
this requirement of res ipsa. The Escola court applied the doctrine in the teeth of defendant's
"evidence tending to show that it exercised considerable precaution.
... Escola, 24 Cal. 2d
453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1949).
23. Indeed, even some early cases evince policy concerns that would be at home in the
era of strict liability. See, e.g., Stolle v. Anheuser-Busch, 307 Mo. 520, 271 S.W. 497 (1925),
in which the Missouri Supreme Court stated that
bottled beverages, containing explosive gases, are put upon the market with the
intention that they will be transported throughout the country and sold to consumers for the profit of the manufacturer. Obviously this should be at his risk.
Public policy requires that the manufacturer should assume the risks and
hazards of explosion incident to the reasonable and ordinarily careful transportation and handling of these goods in the usual course of business. The rule of
liability . . . is fair to the manufacturer, and will afford the consumer . . . and
those handling it in the ordinary course of trade reasonable protection, while the
contrary rule leaves them practically without redress.
Id. at 529, 271 S.W. at 500.
24. A short chain of distribution has been used to simplify my analysis. Many other
parties, including component part manufacturers, lessors and their renters, employers, and
nonpurchasing users and bystanders sometimes participate in the chain of distribution.
25. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461-68, 150 P.2d 436, 440-43 (1944).
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(4) plaintiffs are typically incapable of protecting themselves against
defective products and should not go uncompensated when injury
2
they could neither have foreseen nor prevented actually occurs.

When applied to nonmanufacturing sellers, the rationales for
imposing strict liability weaken. Although many wholesalers and retailers are generally able to absorb the cost of injuries caused by
defective products better than the average consumer, this rationale
for imposing strict liability offers no principled limitations. If the
goal is to pin the cost on the entity best able to bear it, there is no
reason why any sufficiently well-heeled corporate defendant should
not have to pay plaintiff in other areas of tort as well. Conversely, if
plaintiff is a corporate entity and defendant is an individual, this rationale suggests that defendant not pay.2
Another problem with imposing strict liability on nonmanufacturers it that the incentives to market safer products may not work
as well in their case. The argument in favor of imposing strict liability on all parties within the chain of a product's distribution has been
that sellers can exert pressure on those manufacturers with whom
they regularly deal and whose products are defective, by discontinuing, or imposing conditions on, further dealings. The problem with
this argument is its critical dependence on several questionable assumptions: (1) manufacturers who most frequently pay tort judgments are turning out products that are less safe; (2) nonmanufacturing sellers have sufficient knowledge to exert the desired pressure;
and (3) nonmanufacturing sellers have sufficient market power and
26. Id.
27. See, e.g., Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Products Liability, 33 VAND. L.
REV. 681 (1980). Although the loss-shifting and loss-spreading arguments run only in plaintiff's favor, plaintiff must also establish the causal connection between his or her injury and
defendant's conduct. If plaintiff establishes that the defect occurred while the product was in
defendant's hands, one question is whether the downstream defendants caused the accident. In
one sense, the downstream defendants caused the accident because they were part of the distributional system that passed the product through to defendant. In another sense of causation,
however, only the manufacturer actually caused the harm. Some courts seem to have attempted to provide a solution to the question of whether downstream defendants caused the
accident by stating that "in a product liability action, the trier of fact must focus on the
product, not on the manufacturer'sconduct.
... Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413,
417, 573 P.2d 443, 447, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 229 (1978) (emphasis in original).
Following this emphasis, we would conclude that since the product had caused the injury,
liability would extend the length of the chain of distribution. This answer is unsatisfying for
two reasons. First, it yields the anomalous result that those "upstream" from the entity creating the defect would be liable even though the defect was not present when it left their hands.
More fundamentally, it fails to solve the underlying puzzle: Why should the focus be on the
product? There is at least no formal reason for preferring a system that imposes chain-wide
liability for defective products to one that combines a strict liability basis with defendantspecific causation.
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choice to make their decisions count.2 8
The final problem in imposing strict liability on all parties
within the chain of a product's distribution is that typically the supplier has not caused the defect that injures the plaintiff; the defect
has occurred during the manufacture of the product. 9
Courts have long recognized that the arguments for imposing
liability on manufacturers do not work as well for nonmanufacturing
sellers.3 0 Even Judge Traynor, an unalloyed supporter of strict liability against all sellers in the chain of distribution, recognized that
manufacturers deserve liability more than nonmanufacturing sellers.31 Nonetheless, Traynor believed that liability should be imposed
on the retailer as well as on the manufacturer, because the manufacturer may not be amenable to suit and because the retailer is sometimes in a position to exert pressure on the manufacturer to strive
toward greater product safety. 2 Although concern for the plaintiff's
right to recover led Judge Traynor to hold retailers strictly liable,
the potential unfairness of having the retailer pay for conduct more
properly charged to the manufacturer led him also to support the
retailer's indemnity action against the manufacturer.3 3
Although courts were not unanimous in following this terraced
28. These arguments appear to have been somewhat overlooked by commentators on
both sides of the issue whether to impose strict liability as against suppliers. See, e.g., Waite,
Retail Responsibility and Judicial Law Making, 34 MicH. L. REV. 494, 519 (1936) ("[i]f
there be a reason, a public gain in transfer of the loss from the customer to the retailer, the
writer is not aware of it. None seems to be suggested in the decisions other than . . . an
unexplained and unproved assertion that holding the dealer liable somehow conduces to public
safety."); Brown, The Liability of Retail Dealers for Detective Food Products, 23 MINN. L.
REV. 585, 606 (1939) (mentioning the' retailer's ability to cut off future relations with the
producer, but not directly addressing the questions raised in the text).
29. This comment is certainly true of design defects, which are created by the manufacturer who chooses to design a product in a certain way. See Nichols v. Westfield Indus., Ltd.,
380 N.W.2d 392, 396-97 (Iowa 1985). It is also generally true that unintended manufacturing
defects are typically created by the manufacturer. See, e.g., Sheward v. Virtue, 20 Cal. 2d
410, 126 P.2d 345 (1942) (negligence by manufacturer of component part); Simmons Co. v.
Hardon, 75 Ga. App. 420, 43 S.E.2d 553 (1942) (defective sofa bed put out by manufacturer).
30. For an early, elaborate treatment of the problems with imposing strict liability on all
entities within the chain of distribution, see Bowman Biscuit Co. v. Hines, 151 Tex. 370, 251
S.W.2d 153 (1952).
31. In Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 468, 150 P.2d 436, 443 (1949),
for example, he stated: "There is greater reason to impose liability on the manufacturer than
on the retailer who is but a conduit of a product that he is not himself able to test." (Traynor,
J., concurring).
32. Vandemark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 262, 391 P.2d 168, 171, 37 Cal.
Rptr. 896, 899 (1964).
33. Although Judge Traynor concluded in Escola that liability should be imposed on
both the retailer and the manufacturer in the warranty context, this conclusion applies with no
less force to actions brought under strict liability in tort. See 24 Cal. 2d at 464, 150 P.2d at
441-42.
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approach to liability as the above might suggest, 4 many states were
indeed willing to hold suppliers strictly liable, realizing that suppliers
were usually guarantors, made to pay only when the manufacturer
could not be reached. 5 But at least partly because the involvement
of nonmanufacturing suppliers in these cases often led to complications during the course of a litigation,3 and partly because of the
general clamor for tort reform, a host of statutes now restricts an
injured party's right to recover against such suppliers. s7
Statutes restricting an injured party's right to recover against
suppliers have two components. First, the statutes relieve the supplier of liability based on status as a "mere conduit," requiring instead that plaintiff make some showing that defendant had, or
should have had, knowledge of the product defect. 88 The statutes
take one of three approaches to the degree of knowledge of the product defect required for liability." The most generous approach, from
34. See, e.g., Sam Shainberg Co. v. Barlow, 258 So. 2d 242 (Miss. 1972). The Shainberg court refused to apply strict liability to the retailer or wholesaler of a pair of shoes that
never left its original package until the retailer transferred the pair to a rack in the store. The
shoes proved to have a latent defect not discernible by either the retailer or the wholesaler, and
the manufacturer was "reputable and reliable." The court rejected both the strict liability
argument, and the MacPherson view that all parties within the chain of distribution have a
duty "to inspect and discover a latent defect." Id. at 244-45. Although Sam Shainberg has
never been expressly overruled, a federal court recently stated that it has been "strip[ped] . . . ,
of any precedential value." Curry v. Sile Distributors, 727 F. Supp. 1052, 1054 (N.D. Miss.
1990).
35. See. e.g., Vandemark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 262-63, 391 P.2d 168, 171,
37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 899 (1964); Mead v. Warner Pruyn Div., 57 A.D.2d 340, 394 N.Y.S.2d
483 (1977).
36. The Model Uniform Product Liability Act voices concern over imposing a portion of
defense costs on nonmanufacturers. See MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACT, § 105
comment (1979).
37. See supra note 3.
38. See statutes supra note 3.
39. Certain statutes resist membership in any category. Kentucky's provision on the liability of nonmanufacturers, for example, begins by providing a sealed container defense, but
then takes the defense away for those who "knew or should have known ... that the product
was in a defective condition ....
" Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.340 (Baldwin 1988). Similarly, the Maryland statute provides a "sealed container" defense only if the nonmanufacturer
satisfies several requirements, including that "the seller had no knowledge of the defect; [and]
the seller in the performance of the duties he performed or while the product was in his possession could not have discovered the defect while exercising reasonable care." MD. CT. & JUD.
PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-311(b) (1984).
Other statutes are less clear in defining their terms. For example, whereas Minnesota and
North Dakota require a showing of "actual knowledge," MINN. STAT. ANN. § 544.41 (1988);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.1-01-07 (Supp. 1989), Kansas allows the product seller to escape
liability absent "knowledge" of the defect. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3306(a) (1983). Although
the Kansas statute does not expressly state whether it requires actual or constructive knowledge, subsection (b) strongly suggests that constructive knowledge will suffice. Subsection (b)
states that the seller is not liable when "such seller in the performance of any duties the seller
performed, or was required to perform, could not have discovered the defect while exercising
reasonable care.
... Id. at sec. 60-3306(b). Reading these two conjunctive requirements for
supplier exculpation together strongly suggests a constructive knowledge basis of liability, but
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the supplier's point of view, frees a supplier who does not have actual knowledge of the product defect.' 0 An intermediate approach is
subsection (b) raises vexing questions of its own. What duties is the seller "required to perform"? Only those established by contract? Whatever duties the court sees fit to impose?
Georgia's liability-limiting provision is probably the least clear. The statute states that
"[flor purposes of a product liability action based in whole or in part on the doctrine of strict
product liability in tort, a product seller is not a manufacturer . . . and is not liable as such."
GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-11.1(b) (1982). Presumably, this subsection was intended to throw the
supplier's conduct back into the negligence thresher, but more clarity on this issue would have
been welcome.
40. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 2-621 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 544.41 (1988); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.1-06.1 (Supp. 1989). The General Assembly of
Pennsylvania also recently passed a bill that, if enacted, would require the seller to have actual
knowledge of the defect to be liable. House Bill No. 916, Session of 1989, is currently before
the Judiciary Committee of the State Senate. The Pennsylvania bill proposes to couple the
substantive limitations on supplier liability with the procedural mechanisms for removing such
defendants from a case. The bill provides:
Sec. 8374. Basic Limitations on Liability of Suppliers.
(B) Additional Basic Limitation Applicable to Nonmanufacturing
Suppliers.(1) Except as provided in Paragraph (2), a supplier of a product who
did not manufacture the product in whole or in part shall be liable in a
product liability action only if the plaintiff proves one or more of the
following in addition to other elements required by this subchapter or
otherwise applicable law for imposition of liability on that supplier:
(I) The supplier exercised substantial control over the design,
testing, packaging or labeling of or the providing of warning or
instruction about that aspect of the product which caused the
harm for which recovery of damages is sought.
(II) The supplier altered or modified the product, and that
alteration or modification was a substantial factor in causing the
harm for which recovery of damages is sought.
(III) The supplier had, at the time that supplier supplied the
product, actual knowledge of the product defect which caused the
harm for which recovery of damages is sought.
(IV) The supplier made an express factual representation
about that aspect of the product which caused the harm for which
recovery of damages is sought.
(2) Paragraph (1) shall not apply if:
(1) Valid in personam jurisdiction cannot be obtained in this
Commonwealth over either a manufacturer of the product or any
other supplier described in paragraph (1) (1) through (IV); or
(I1) The court determines that neither a manufacturer of the
product nor any other supplier described in paragraph (1)(l)
through (IV) would be able to satisfy a judgment if found liable in
a product liability action.
(3) A nonmanufacturing supplier shall be dismissed from a product
liability action without prejudice upon filing of an affidavit stating:
(I) That all information in the possession of the supplier concerning the identity of the manufacturers and other suppliers of
the product at issue has been provided to the plaintiff; and
(II) That the supplier is not described in Paragraph (I) (1)
through (IV).
The filing of such affidavit shall have the effect of tolling or extending the statute of limitations as to the supplier filing it. If the court
determines that the statements made in any affidavit filed hereunder are
inaccurate, or that no manufacturer or other supplier described in para-
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negligence-based, and establishes liability when the supplier "knew
or should have known" of the defect, 41 or, more simply, when it acted with negligence."2 The least generous reform from the supplier's
perspective relieves the seller of liability only when knowledge of the
defect is presumptively impossible (or at least almost so), as when
the product is in a sealed container.4 8
The statutes' second component permits the plaintiff to retain
the supplier as a guarantor. Reflecting Judge Traynor's concern with
leaving plaintiff without remedy, most jurisdictions permit the supplier to be "transformed" into a manufacturer (thus subject to strict
liability) when the manufacturer is unavailable to plaintiff.4 ' The
other, and little followed, alternative is to make plaintiff bear the
risk that the manufacturer will be unavailable. 8
Such remedial legislation also affects indemnification actions.
Since holding a supplier liable requires some showing of fault, 4 the
supplier, once held liable, will have difficulty pursuing an action for
indemnification, although a contribution claim may remain.' When
graph (1) (1) through (IV) is both subject to valid in personam jurisdiction in this commonwealth and able to satisfy a judgment if found liable
in a product liability action, the court shall, upon motion of a party, immediately reinstate the claims against such supplier.
(4) Paragraph (3) is not intended to preclude any other means by
which a nonmanufacturing supplier may seek dismissal from a product
liability action on the basis of this subsection or otherwise, and this subsection is not intended to preclude any other defense available to a nonmanufacturing supplier in a product liability action.
41. See IDAHO CODE § 6-1407(1) (1980); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 20-9-9 (1987).
42. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.78(A)(1) (Baldwin 1989); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 7.72.040 (West Supp. 1990).
43. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-1 - B-4 (1989); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-106 (Supp.
1990).
44. See statutes supra note 3. The Model Uniform Products Liability Act imposes liability against the supplier when the manufacturer is not subject to jurisdiction, or is insolvent, or
when the court determines that it would be highly likely that the claimant would be unable to

enforce a judgment against the manufacturer.

MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACT

§§

105 (1979).
45. See GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-11.1 (Supp. 1990); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-21, 181
(1989); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS, § 20-9-9 (1987).
46. "Fault" may also include a supplier's failure to discover a defective condition. In
such cases, the supplier may obtain indemnification against the manufacturer by application of
the active/passive negligence distinction. This liability structure again reflects judicial ambivalence towards the supplier's role in a product liability action. As Professor Shapo states: "Indeed, putting aside the imposition of strict liability on policy grounds, intermediate sellers who
are not manufacturers generally do not have a duty to inspect or test specifically for latent
defects, especially when the product is sold in the original package." See M. SHAPO, THE LAW
OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY
14.04 [2] [a] (1987).
47. See, e.g., Frazer v. A.F. Munsterman, Inc., 123 Ill. 2d 245, 527 N.E.2d 1248
(1988), in which the Illinois Supreme Court ruled a claim for indemnification in a product
liability action could not be maintained by a party who had been found negligent. Id. at 269,
527 N.E.2d at 1258-59.
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the supplier is not at fault, an action for indemnification should lie."8

The structure and interpretation of the various statutes portend
changes in the liability relations among manufacturer, supplier, and
injured party. A nascent body of case law has begun to redefine this

terrain, but has at times done so in apparent disregard of the statutory language. I now turn to this body of statutory and case law. The
vehicle for analysis is separate consideration of the various classes of
defects: manufacturing defects, design defects, and inadequate
warnings.
Before I proceed, however, two comments are in order. First,
although I have, for convenience and necessity's sake, grouped these
statutes limiting supplier liability into the general categories noted
above, important variations exist within these groups. To choose just
one obvious example, statutes that I have classified as requiring
"negligence" to support supplier liability differ in important respects.
Statutes may start by defining negligence differently, and then may
multiply that initial dissimilarity in treating issues such as the effect
of the manufacturer's unavailability, the level of product involvement necessary to "convert" a supplier into a manufacturer, and defenses."' The example set forth in the footnote highlights the com48. Perhaps surprisingly, courts are divided over whether states that have enacted contribution, but not indemnity, statutes intended to do away with all actions for implied indemnity. The Illinois Supreme Court has repeatedly declined to answer the question. See Frazer v.
A.F. Munsterman, Inc., 123 III. 2d 245, 537 N.E.2d 1248 (1988). In contrast, a federal court
applying Michigan law has permitted such an indemnification action by sellers whose "involvement with [the] product, was solely as a seller." LaFountain v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 680 F.
Supp. 251, 253 (E.D. Mich. 1988). Permitting the survival of indemnification actions by faultless suppliers is consistent with the rationale for holding suppliers liable in the first place. See
supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
49. As an illustration of such differences, compare the Ohio and South Dakota responses
to the problem of supplier liability. Ohio's statute is among the most detailed. It begins by
pegging supplier liability to a showing of "negligence," OHIO REV. CODE § 2307.78(A)(l)
(Supp. 1989), or to misrepresentation, id., § 2307.78(A)(2). Those limitations, however, are
expressly subordinated to § 2307.78(B), which treats the supplier as a manufacturer when any
one of the following applies:
(1) the manufacturer of that product is not subject to judicial process in
[Ohio];
(2) the claimant will be unable to enforce a judgment against the manufacturer of that product due to actual or asserted insolvency of the manufacturer;
(3) the supplier in question owns or, when it supplied that product, owned,
in whole or in part, the manufacturer of that product;
(4) the supplier in question is owned or, when it supplied that product, was
owned in whole or in part, by the manufacturer of that product;
(5) the supplier in question created or furnished a manufacturer with the
design or formulation that was used to produce, create, make, construct, assemble, or rebuild that product or a component of that product;
(6) the supplier in question altered, modified, or failed to maintain that
product after it came into the possession of, and before it left the possession of,
the supplier in question, and the alteration, modification, or failure to maintain
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plexity of such differences and the danger of uncritical lumping of
these statutes.
Second, although the focus of this paper is descriptive, I will
nonetheless preface the remarks that follow by stating here my opposition to legislation limiting liability to those suppliers who have "actual knowledge" that a product is defective. The reasons that might

be advanced in favor of such a suffocating restriction I find unpersuasive, and I remain unconvinced that those commercial entities in
the chain of a product's distibution should enjoy a restriction on liability not shared by defendants in other types of litigation. 0
that product rendered it defective;
(7) the supplier in question marketed that product under its own label or
trade name;
(8) the supplier in question failed to response timely and reasonably to a
written request by or on behalf of the claimant to disclose to the claimant the
name and address of the manufacturer of that product." Id. § 2307.78(B).
After working through that list, application of defenses must be considered. Interestingly,
Ohio permits suppliers !o assert a contributory negligence defense when the claim against the
supplier arises under § 2307.78(A)(1), which is negligence based, but otherwise does not permit the defense against either supplier or manufacturers. Id. § 2315.20(C)(2). For the details
of the contributory negligence defense, see id. § 2315.19.
In contrast, South Dakota has only this to say on the subject of supplier liability:
No cause of action based on the doctrine of strict liability in tort may be
asserted or maintained against any distributor, wholesaler, dealer or retail seller
of a product which is alleged to contain or possess a latent defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the buyer, user or consumer unless said distributor,
wholesaler, dealer or retail seller is also the manufacturer or assembler of said
product or the maker of a component part of the final product, or unless said
[entity] knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known, of the
defective condition of the final product. Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit any other cause of action from being brought against any seller of
a product.

S.D.

CODIFIED LAWS

§ 20-9-9 (1987).

While it may make no practical difference that one statute uses the term negligence, while
the other speaks in negligence terms, South Dakota's use of the troublesome "unreasonably
dangerous" phrase may create a divergent body of case law.
A more central difference between the two is that South Dakota allows the supplier to
escape liability even when the manufacturer is unavailable, while Ohio shows its preference for
compensating the injured party. Because of this difference, there is no need for South Dakota
to spell out situations in which the supplier is "transformed" into a manufacturer, and no need
for special rules on comparative negligence as applied to strict liability against suppliers.
This first-pass look at two statutes dramatizes the rich variation these statutes exhibit. For
this reason, I have resisted the temptation to create a "user-friendly" chart comparing and
contrasting these statutes by rough type.
50. Those favoring the "actual knowledge" approach might argue that imposing liability
against those suppliers who exercise substantial control over the product's creation, distribution, or alteration provides injured parties with a sufficient safeguard. But negligence can occur
in ways unrelated to control; a wholesaler might negligently (or even recklessly) fail to notice a
defect that should be obvious. This inadvertent strain of negligence constitutes the bulk of
automobile accident cases, for example. One might also defend the "actual knowledge" approach by pointing to the cost of product liability litigation unjustly absorbed by the retailer.

See, e.g.,

MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT,

analysis accompanying § 105. But this

argument fails to explain, as a normative matter, why imposing negligence-based liability is
"unjust," when it is not so considered in other tort litigation.
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Supplier Liability for Manufacturing Defects

The great majority of early product liability cases involved manufacturing, or construction, defects. 5 1 Products exhibiting this type
of defect were typically anomalies that the manufacturer did not intend to produce - the tire with defective rubber, the bottle under
excessive pressure, the chair made of defective wood. Not until later
did courts become concerned about cases in which injured parties
sought to hold defendants liable for their conscious design
decisions.5 2
This section considers the effect of supplier liability reform statutes on manufacturing defects. The hypothetical cases and analyses
set forth below demonstrate that application of the statutes may
yield surprising results, particularly when the statute establishes a
"sealed container" defense.
A.

Problems with Defining Products that are "Sealed"
Let us begin with the least troublesome case:
Case 1. Retailer is a small, struggling grocery store that
purchases canned tuna from Tuna World, a financially successful local manufacturer with an impeccable record for quality
control and inspection. A single can, itself sound, is sold to Consumer, who contracts botulism from the tuna. No other cans
contain harmful impurities.

This situation is a favorite of those seeking to limit supplier liability; here, the supplier is no more at fault than the consumer. The
51. See, e.g., Lill v. Murphy Door Bed Co., 290 Ill. App. 328, 8 N.E.2d 715 (1937)
(defective metal used in construction of bed); Simmons Co. v. Hardin, 75 Ga. App. 420, 43
S.E.2d 553 (1947) (defective clamp on sofa bed); Okker v. Chrome Furniture Mfg. Corp., 26
N.J. Super. 295, 97 A.2d 699 (App. Div. 1953) (defective bar stool).

52. See R. EPSTEIN,

CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS,

at 612 (5th ed. 1990): "The...

present stage of products liability law began with a series of important (what are now widely
known as) defective design and duty to warn cases, decided shortly after the 1965 Restatement
[(Second)]. These cases . . . form the centerpiece of modern products liability law."
Indeed, heavy criticism met the decision to draft section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (which lent impressive pedigree to the theory that liability for defective products
should attach without regard to fault) with breadth sufficient to cover design defects. Among
the most vocal critics of the Restatement's expansive position was Dean Page Keeton, who
noted:
I, unlike the authors of the Restatement, would limit the use of the word "defective" to the case of an unintended condition, a miscarriage in the manufacturing
process. Most of the decisions applying strict liability notions have involved "defective" products in this limited sense, particularly those decisions dealing with
mechanical and industrial products.
Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability: The Meaning of "Defect' in the Manufacture and Design of
Products, 20 SYRACUSE L. REv. 559, 562 (1969).
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supplier did not cause the defect, and may not be better positioned
than the consumer to bear the loss. Indeed, even the least generous
reform legislation is ideally suited to deal with this type of case,
which defines a "sealed container" situation - the product simply
was not "open" to inspection.
States such as Tennessee and North Carolina follow the "sealed
container" approach most closely, affording the supplier a defense
only if it was afforded no reasonable opportunity to inspect the product or if such inspection would not have revealed the defect.53 This
limited defense proved to be successful in Grindstaffv. Singer Co.,54
in which the district court, applying Tennessee law, granted prediscovery summary judgment for the seller of an air conditioner allegedly containing a defective compressor.55 Plaintiff was unable to
point to any facts that might defeat the defense. Moreover, the
plaintiff was unable to support any other allegation of negligence
since the defect was isolated, the seller had no reasonable opportunity to inspect, and an inspection would not have revealed the
defect.56
If the plaintiff cannot defeat the sealed container defense, statutes basing liability on a more general showing of negligence and
statutes requiring actual knowledge of the defect will also bar recovery. Surprisingly, even if the applicable defense is available, most
states still require the supplier to make plaintiff whole when the
common law would have reached the same result. For example, in
Tennessee, the supplier will be "transformed" into a manufacturer
when the manufacturer is either insolvent or not amenable to jurisdiction. 57 This means that the supplier, although not liable under the
statute's general rule, will pay in the very same situations in which
an indemnification suit would have been unavailing.
But the statute may have a decisive effect on the supplier's position in settlement negotiations. When the supplier knows that the
statute protects it from liability, and when the supplier also knows
that the manufacturer is an available defendant, the supplier will
have no reason to participate in settlement negotiations. Keeping
suppliers out of such negotiations is to be encouraged, since current
53.
1990).
54.
55.
56.

See N.C.

GEN. STAT.

§ 99B-2(a) (1990);

TENN. CODE ANN.

§ 29-28-106(a) (Supp.

518 F. Supp. 44 (E.D. Tenn. 1981).
Id. at 45.
Sanctions may have been appropriate since the statute provided that no action "shall

be commenced" against a nonmanufacturer unless one of the statutory exceptions is met. See
TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-106 (Supp. 1990).
57.

Id. § 29-28-106(A)(2), (3) (Supp. 1990).
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law "subjects suppliers to substantial . . . premiums and defense

costs. These costs are added to the price of products and waste legal
resources."' 8 In contrast, without the "sealed container" defense,
even a "pure" supplier faces the spectre of some liability, because a
jury's finding that the supplier was in any measure responsible for
the accident operates to defeat the supplier's subsequent indemnification action against the manufacturer.' Suppliers have thus felt
pressure to contribute to the settlement pot.
Of course, whether the statutes will actually have such a salutary effect on the settlement process depends largely on judicial interpretation of the applicable defense. Interesting questions may
arise, particularly when courts try to determine the reach of the
sealed container defense. Consider the following situation:
Case 2. A Corporation manufactures trailers equipped with
hitches and hooks to secure them to trucks. A Corporation has
an excellent reputation for safety and quality control, and regularly sells trailers to B Corporation, which then rents the trailers
to drivers. One trailer, properly tethered to a truck by Renter,
contains an apparently sound hook which is in fact made of deficient metal. When the hook snaps, the trailer slams into the
truck, injuring Renter. Renter sues both A Corporation and B
Corporation, alleging that B Corporation was negligent in not
inspecting the products it rented. 60
First, consider the differences between the above case and Case
1. The tuna fish retailer from Case I could not inspect the product
being sold because that would require opening enough cans to satisfy
a court that a reasonable inspection had taken place. Yet, any
opened can could not be sold. (If a court took the extra step of requiring inspection of every can in order to defeat an inference of
negligence, the practical result would be a return to strict liability if the retailers were not driven out of business - because at that
58. MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACT, § 105 analysis (1979).
59. This follows from the proposition that indemnification is generally available when
"one . . . is held responsible solely by imputation of law because of a relation to the actual
wrongdoer," PROSSER & KEETON. THE LAW OF TORTS § 51 (5th ed. 1984), and not when the

party seeking indemnification is also at fault. Prosser and Keeton point out that indemnification has sometimes also been granted to suppliers who negligently rely upon suppliers, id., but
presumably indemnification would not be proper when more active evidence of negligence is
available.
60. These facts are suggested by Frazer v. A.F. Munsterman, Inc., 123 lll.2d 245, 527
N.E. 2d 1248 (1988), except that Frazer involved other asserted acts of negligence by the
renting company, including failure to appreciate the inadequacy of a certain type of hook for
vehicles such as the one the renting customer was driving. Id. at 271, 527 N.E.2d at 1259
(Miller, J., specially concurring).
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point the retailer might as well open no cans.) Once the cans were
opened, the retailer would have to inspect the tuna for possible dangers, raising the further question of which tests to run.
Assuming the hook snap defect is detectable upon sight inspection, Case 2 differs from Case I in that the supplier does not have to
tamper with the product and subsequently render it valueless in order to discover the defect. For example, if the hook was half as thick
as other hooks received from the manufacturer, a visual inspection
would reveal the defect, and the case would, at once, be removed
from the sealed container context, thus providing a strong negligence
argument for plaintiff.
But if the defect is not discernible upon sight inspection because
the defect is in the type of material used, Case 2 resembles Case 1 in
that testing the hook snaps for the metal's deficiency might require
rendering the hook as unusable as the opened can of tuna."' And the
two cases are also similar in other material respects: the manufacturer and the supplier have an ongoing contractual relationship; the
manufacturer is reputable; and the defect is "one-of-a-kind."
The concern with saddling the defendant with an impossible
duty has led state legislatures to amend the law to require that the
nonmanufacturing supplier have at least a reasonable opportunity to
discover the defect before liability will attach.6" Courts, in turn, have
relied on both the relevant statute and the Restatement (Second) of
Torts section 402, and have refrained from equating failure to inspect with negligence. 8 Thus, Case 2 is treated in much the same
way as Case 1, absent some obvious defect that a cursory examination would reveal. 64
61. For a case involving deficient metal, see C.L. Pouncey v. Ford Motor Co., 464 F.2d
957 (5th Cir. 1972), in which plaintiff's expert testified that the radiator fan that broke off and
injured plaintiff suffered from "premature fatigue failure ... caused by an excessive number
of inclusions in the metal of the blade. An inclusion is a non-metallic impurity in the steel
which weakens the metal." Id. at 958.
62. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
63. Section 402 provides:
Absence of Duty to Inspect Chattel
A seller of a chattel manufactured by a third person, who neither knows nor
has reason to know that it is, or is likely to be, dangerous, is not liable in an

action for negligence for harm caused by the dangerous character or condition of
the chattel because of his failure to discover the danger by an inspection or test
of the chattel before selling it.

§ 402 (1965).
64. Of course, one person's "obvious" defect may be another's mystery. This was the
situation in Crothers v. Cohen, 384 N.W.2d 562 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986), in which plaintiff
claimed that a used car dealership was negligent in not discovering the absence of a stopper in
a rebuilt carburetor. Plaintiff and his friend examined the engine, but neither plaintiff nor his
friend observed the defect. An engineering expert testified, however, that such a defect would
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
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B. Effect of Statutes on Cases Involving Evidence of Supplier
Negligence

As suggested above, any shift toward allowing the jury to consider allegations of negligence such as those raised by Case 2 may
effectively return the supplier to the position of strict liability. Other
acts of negligence may also be alleged, however, and at least some of
these should result in liability even under statutes insulating the sup-

plier from strict liability. Consider the following:
Case a. Assume the same facts as Case 1, except Tuna World
has the worst record in the tuna industry for safety. Tuna World
has been repeatedly cited for health violations, and is reported to
be on the brink of bankruptcy. Perhaps as a result of negative
publicity, its prices are lower than those of competing manufacturers. There have been published reports of several people becoming ill after eating the tuna, although causation has not been
clearly established. Retailer is aware of those reports. The can
sold to plaintiff was irregularly shaped.
The new facts in the Tuna World hypothetical strongly suggest
that Retailer was negligent in selling the tuna to plaintiff because
Retailer should be aware of some risk in selling the tuna. Removing
one or more of these signposts of Tuna World's negligence reduces
the strength of the inference, but any one of the negligence indications should allow plaintiff to reach the jury under any statute that
provides that some showing of negligence is a sufficient basis for imposing liability against the supplier. The statutes that require a
showing of actual knowledge for the supplier to be liable, however,
would continue to insulate Retailer.
Minnesota provides a good example of the actual knowledge approach, interesting as much for its novel procedural provisions as for
its substantive rules of supplier liability. Minnesota statutes permit
have been obvious to a qualified mechanic. The court's decision imposed upon the used car
dealership a duty to have "someone with mechanical knowledge inspect the car for obvious
defects before reselling it to a member of the public." Id. at 565. The Crothers holding recognizes that the purchaser of a used car may be relying on the regular seller to make a cursory
inspection for any risks to personal safety. The Crothers result seems inconsistent with the
Restatement because the plain langugae of the Restatement does not require inspection of
products by sellers. But the Restatement's reasons for not requiring an inspection may support
requiring an inspection when the defect is obvious. The Restatement's rationale for not requiring an inspection is that "[t]he burden on the seller of requiring him to inspect chattels which
he reasonably believes to be free from hidden danger outweighs the magnitude of the risk that
a particular chattel may be dangerously defective." See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS, §
402, comment d (1965). Because the burden of requiring the seller to inspect products for
obvious defects does not outweigh the magnitude of the risk, seller should inspect for obvious
defects under the Restatement rationale. Id.
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the injured party to bring a cause of action against anyone in the
chain of distribution.65 The nonmanufacturing supplier must then attempt to certify by affidavit the identity of the manufacturer."
Plaintiff then brings suit against the manufacturer, and the supplier
is dismissed, unless the plaintiff can show one of a list of problems
with the manufacturer, such as the manufacturer's insolvency, lack
of jurisdiction over the manufacturer, or expiration of the statute of
limitations.""
In addition, the nonmanufacturing supplier remains in the case
if the supplier exercises "some significant control over the design or
manufacture of the product, or has provided instructions or warnings
to the manufacturer relative to the alleged defect. . .; had actual
knowledge of the defect. . .; or created the defect.""8
As applied to Case la, the Minnesota statute's approach would
insulate Retailer from liability since none of the bases for holding
the supplier liable applies. Retailer neither exercised control over the
manufacturing process, nor provided warnings, nor created the defect. But the most startling provision of the Minnesota statute is that
unless one of the other exceptions applies, the supplier will not be
liable unless plaintiff can prove that defendant acted knowingly. Although the Retailer's conduct in Case ]a is probably highly negligent, Retailer's conduct is not intentional. A slight change in facts
might change the result under the Minnesota statutory approach.
For example, if the consumers in Case la who had become ill could
establish causation, some courts may allow reckless conduct to satisfy the "actual knowledge" requirement in order to hold Retailer
liable.69
The potential result of cases in sealed container jurisdictions is
even more anomalous than the result under statutes requiring actual
65. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 544.41 (West 1988 & Supp. 1990). Thus, the plaintiff
avoids sanctions when he sues a supplier who cannot be liable. Compare TENN. CODE ANN. §
29-28-106 (Supp. 1990), which provides that no action shall be brought against a non-negligent supplier. Under the Tennessee approach, sanctions against plaintiff are arguably appropriate when plaintiff, knowing the manufacturer to be solvent and amenable to jurisdiction,
and the supplier to be a mere conduit, nonetheless files suit against that supplier. Id.
66. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 544.41 (West 1988 & Supp. 1990).
67. Id.
68. Id. (emphasis added).
69. Language in Ultramares v. Touche, Niven & Co., 255 N.Y. 170, 179 N.E. 441

(1921) supports the theory that reckless conduct could support the "actual knowledge" requirement. Ultramares stated that "[elven an opinion ...may be found to be fraudulent if
the grounds supporting it are so flimsy as to lead to the conclusion that there was no genuine
belief back of it." 255 N.Y. at 186, 174 N.E. at 447. Likewise, Retailer's decision to continue
selling the tuna that was suspicious-looking suggests that Retailer's belief that the tuna was
safe was not genuine.
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knowledge. The sealed container defense is typically more limited
than the general negligence defense. 70 Nevertheless, the sealed
container defense could have the unexpected result of protecting the
Retailer in Case la, even though liability would be proper under
straight negligence statutes. For example, the North Carolina statute
releases from liability those sellers who transfer their products in a
sealed container, or who are "afforded no reasonable opportunity to
inspect the product in such a manner that would have
the existence of the condition complained of . . .-.

. . .

revealed

Since the North Carolina provision is in the disjunctive, the supplier can apparently escape liability by meeting either of the two
conditions. If the statute is given a straightforward reading, the supplier would not be liable since the tuna is in a sealed container. Even
if a court reads the provision as imposing liability on suppliers of
sealed containers who fail to take advantage of an opportunity to
inspect, it is difficult to see how an inspection would be possible,
since (after all) the product is in a sealed container. The only possibility for imposing liability here would seem to hinge on emphasis of
the can's irregular shape, which might give rise to a duty to inspect
that particular unit (and then to remove it from retail).
One might be tempted to seek to impose liability based on the
other indications of negligence in Case la, such as the published reports that might have made Retailer's decision to sell the tuna unreasonable. But this more general negligence argument seems foreclosed by the statute's definition of "product liability action," which
includes "any action brought for or on account of personal injury,
death or property damage caused by or resulting from the manufacture . . . of any product. ' 72 Since the statute also prohibits bringing
a "product liability action" against suppliers except in the circumstances set forth above, a more traditional negligence case would
presumably be unavailable.
Recent North Carolina cases, however, suggest a different interpretation of its products liability statute and underscore the hazards
of prediction. In Morrison v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 73 the North
Carolina Supreme Court addressed whether an action brought for
breach of implied warranty of merchantability 4 was within the defi70.
which a
71.
72.
73.
74.

This is so because the sealed container defense applies only to a subset of cases in
supplier is not negligent.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-2(a) (1989).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-1 (1989).
319 N.C. 298, 354 S.E.2d 495 (1987).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-314 (1989).
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nition of "product liability action."' 75 If so, defendant retailer intended to raise the sealed container defense.
The court used a two-step analysis to conclude that implied
warranty claims were indeed covered by the definition of product liability action, and therefore were subject to applicable defenses. First,
such claims plainly arise from the "selling" of any product, which
means they meet the statutory definition of "product liability action." Second, express warranties are specifically excluded from the
sealed container defense. Under the statutory construction rule of
expressio unius est exclusio alterius,76 the court found that implied
warranty was amenable to the defense."
Although Morrison considered only a breach of implied warranty claim, the decision raises implications for a negligence-based
claim meeting the definition of "product liability action." It seems
clear that negligence-based claims would also be covered by the
sealed container defense, since they are also other than allegations of
breach of express warranty. To reiterate the analysis of Case ]a:
Plaintiff brings a product liability action grounded in negligence and
defendant asserts the sealed container defense. Since that defense
literally applies, no liability should attach.
Whether the North Carolina Supreme Court will find negligence-based claims to meet the definition of product liability action
remains to be seen. At least one intermediate North Carolina court
decision suggests that more general allegations of negligence may
survive the sealed container defense. In Sutton v. Major Products
Co.,78 the North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed a summary
judgment in favor of product distributors who received and passed
along a paint whitener that was in a sealed container. 79 Besides recognizing the statutory sealed container defense, the court assumed
that the defense would not have been available if the plaintiffs had
been able to substantiate their negligence claim. The court's discus75.

Morrison, 319 N.C. at 305, 354 S.E.2d at 498.

76. "The expression of one thing is the exclusion of another." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990).
77. Morrison, 319 N.C. at 305, 354 S.E.2d at 498-99.
78. 91 N.C. App. 610, 372 S.E.2d 897 (1988).
79. Id. at 614; 372 S.E.2d at 899-900. Sutton also involved a dispute over whether the
defect was a manufacturing or design defect. Plaintiffs alleged that at least one of the nonmanufacturing suppliers had "actual or constructive" knowledge of the dangerous propensities of
the whitener, but plaintiffs were unable to substantiate these allegations. The court appears to
have treated the case as one involving a manufacturing defect. Id. The distinction is important
because if a design defect is involved, the case is removed from the "pure" sealed container
context since available information may give rise to a duty to warn. See infra notes 83-101 and
accompanying text. In a manufacturing defect case, the product anomaly cannot be discovered
absent an opportunity to inspect.
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sion of negligence conspicuously omitted reference to the sealed
container statute.80 If the state's supreme court follows this approach, of course, the sealed container defense will effectively have
been collapsed into a negligence analysis.
The above observations reveal several interesting points. First,
in "pure" manufacturing defect cases, such as Case 1, the statutory
release of suppliers from liability may not affect whether the supplier
must pay plaintiff, at least not when the supplier has a statutory or
common law right to indemnity. Nonetheless, suppliers may be more
confident in their refusal to become involved in settlement negotiations since they are not substantively liable.
Second, courts have the ability to limit the effectiveness of the
supplier's defenses. For example, they may be cautious in defining
"sealed container" or may invoke a "negligent failure to inspect"
analysis. Nevertheless, courts must guard against defeating the legislature's intent to limit the situations in which suppliers may be held
liable.
Finally, in those cases that have negligence indications that
threaten to knock the supplier from its "mere conduit" perch, careful (perhaps inventive) analysis of the relevant statute may turn up
surprises on the question of supplier liability.
IV. Supplier Liability for Defective Design and Breach of the Duty
to Warn
It should not be surprising that the statutes limiting supplier
liability would have their greatest effect in those manufacturing defect cases in which liability approaches strict."' But what effect do
such statutes have when the theory of liability incorporates a negligence analysis? One might expect that statutes predicating supplier
80. In considering the negligence claim, the court stated: "Liability of a distributor or
seller of goods depends on whether the seller knew or by the exercise of reasonable care, could
have discovered the dangerous character or condition of the goods." 91 N.C. at 613, 372
S.E.2d at 899. Again relying on negligence law, and ignoring the statute, the court reaffirmed
the rule that "a seller of a product made by a reputable manufacturer, where he acts as a
mere conduit and has no knowledge or reason to know of a product's dangerous propensities,
'is under no affirmative duty to inspect or test for a latent defect ....
' " Id. at 614, 372

S.E.2d at 900, quoting 2a L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6.03[l][a]
(1988). The contrary implication is that when the manufacturer is not reputable, negligence
liability is proper. This result, however, ignores the statutory language.
81. One argument is that, even in manufacturing defect cases, liability is not truly strict

because the defendant can generally be presumed to be negligent, and the purpose of the strict
liability rule is to remove insurmountable proof problems. See Halphen v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp., 484 So. 2d 110 (La. 1986); Gordon v. General Motors Corp., 323 So. 2d 496 (La.
Ct. App. 1975); Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825,
850 (1973).
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liability on a showing of negligence would have little effect in either
design defect or failure to warn cases, because some showing of negligence is already required for the imposition of liability in these
82
cases.
But statutes limiting supplier liability may have significant effects when the claim is for defective design or for failure to warn.
These effects will depend upon the variation of the supplier defense
statute, the conduct of both manufacturer and one or more of the
suppliers, and the availability of a state of the art defense.
A.

Design Defect Cases
Consider a case involving a design defect:
Case 3. Plaintiff was driving a new car he owned and had purchased from AutoLand, an automobile retailer, and which BigThree Corporation manufactured. Plaintiff was seriously injured
when another car struck his car broadside. His subsequent suit
alleged that the car was defectively designed, inasmuch as it
used an "X frame," as opposed to a safer "box frame," which
had steel side rails to protect the car's occupants in the event of
a collision from the side. Plaintiff introduced evidence that other
manufacturers used the "box frame" construction."

Case 3 presents an example of an alleged defective design. The
manufacturer intended to construct the car with the "X frame," and
plaintiff contends that all products in this particular line are culpably defective. In contrast, manufacturing defects are unintentional
and occur occasionally.'
Theoretically, the liability resulting from manufacturing and
design defects is the same; once plaintiff can establish that the product that caused the injury was defective, recovery is permitted
82. "[D]efective design and duty to warn cases ... have expanded liability within the
traditional framework of negligence law .... " R. EPSTEIN. CASES AND MATERIALS ON
TORTS, at 612 (5th ed. 1990). See also infra text accompanying notes 86-87.
83. See, e.g., Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1966). The facts in Evans were identical to the facts in Case 3. In Evans,
the plaintiff lost because of the now largely discredited theory that auto manufacturers had no
duty to design their products to withstand collisions because collisions were not the "intended
purpose" of automobiles. The modern rule permits recovery against auto manufacturers when
the car is involved in an accident, on the theory that a car's involvement in an accident is
emminently foreseeable. See, e.g., Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 321
A.2d 737 (1974).
84. Manufacturing defects are "unintended flaws in the product" that are found in
"only a small percentage of a manufacturer's products. Such products are easy to identify
because the product differs from other similar products in the line." FISCHER & POWERS,
PRODUCTS LIABILITY: CASES AND MATERIALS, at 57 (1988).
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against the manufacturer and against all other parties within the
chain of a product's distribution, without proof of negligence. But it
is by now well-settled that the means of establishing defect in the
manufacturing and design defect cases are greatly dissimilar. A
manufacturing defect is established by showing that what took place
is not what the manufacturer intended. For example, the bottle exploded; the tuna contained botulism; the metal was badly forged.
In contrast, a claim of defective design cannot be established
without resort to some external standard, often one invoked by comparing defendant's products to others'. Thus, plaintiff in Case 3
claims that the "box frames" design should be the standard, and
that BigThree must pay when its inferior design results in injury.
Casting about for some yardstick by which to make these comparisons, courts have struck upon a range of tests."5 Barker v. Lull
Engineering Co. 6 provides the best-known standard for establishing
design defect. In Barker, the California Supreme Court stated that
"'aproduct may be found defective in design" when the product either fails to meet reasonable consumer expectations, or when "the
[do not] outweigh the risk of danbenefits of the challenged design
'87
ger inherent in such design."
The negligence heritage of the latter standard is plain. Commentators have repeatedly urged that the presence of side-by-side
claims for strict liability and negligence in the context of defective
design serves only to confuse juries, and that the two theories should
therefore be merged.8a But what should be the effect of statutes limiting supplier liability on cases involving defective design?
85. California's test is perhaps the best known, but is not the only one. To take two
other examples, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that a defect may be found "where
the product left the supplier's control lacking any element necessary to make it safe for its
intended use or possessing any feature that renders it unsafe for the intended use[,]" Azzarello
v. Black Bros. Co., 480 Pa. 547, 559, 391 A.2d 1020, 1027 (1978), whereas the Kansas Supreme Court adopted the consumer expectation test in Lester v. Magic Chef, Inc., 230 Kan.
643, 641 P.2d 353 (1982).
86. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
87. Id. at 432, 573 P.2d at 455-56, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237-38. See also United States v.
Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947) for an earlier case in which a court engaged
in this balancing of risks and benefits.
88. See generally, D. NOEL & J. PHILLIPS, PRODUCTS LIABILITY: CASES AND MATERIALS, at 358-61 (2d ed. 1982). Noel and Phillips' analysis leaves out possible differences between the two theories. In California, for example, "once the plaintiff makes a prima facie
showing that the injury was proximately caused by the product's design, the burden should
appropriately shift to the defendant to prove ... that the product is not defective." Barker, 20
Cal. 3d at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237. But there is no good reason why the
same shift in the burden, if it makes sense in the strict liability context, should not also apply
when a negligence claim is asserted. Indeed, Barker intimated as much. Id. As to possible
differences between the two theories when defendant raises a state of the art defense, see infra
notes 111-23 and accompanying text.
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The effect that statutes limiting supplier liability will have on
cases involving defective design depends largely on the types of reform statutes. If the supplier has only the sealed container defense,
the supplier will have a difficult time extricating itself from many
design defect cases, since the "defect" in the product may not be
hidden.89 For example, a supplier entitled only to the sealed
container defense might have difficulty escaping liability in the following situation:
Case 4. A car is defectively designed because the gasoline tank
is placed too close to the engine. The proximity of the two is
obvious to the auto dealer. Owner is injured when the engine
overheats and a spark causes the gasoline to ignite.
On the other hand, the impracticability of requiring inspection,
which justifies the sealed container defense, may be dispositive in a
case such as the following:
Case 5. A lawnmower is defectively designed because one of its
internal (and therefore hidden) components cannot withstand
the heat generated by the motor. The component breaks off and
strikes LawnBoy while he is mowing his lawn. Yard Palace, the
seller, neither knows, nor has reason to know, of the mower's
defective design. The manufacturer does have such knowledge,
and has considered and rejected alternative designs.' 0
The analyses in Cases 4 and 5 would begin in the same way: the
manufacturer is liable because the product was defectively designed.
This conclusion requires using negligence principles that presumably
would not be applicable against a supplier that did not design the
product. In both cases, the defect was present at the time the product left the manufacturer.
Will the suppliers in both Cases 4 and 5 be liable as "downstream" sellers in a sealed container jurisdiction? Here the cases diverge. Initially, the dealer in Case 4 appears to be liable since the
supplier in a sealed container defense jurisdiction would be liable
when that defense does not apply. Because the justification for the
89. One argument is that if the "defect" is obvious to the dealer, the defect must be just
as obvious to the consumer. The dealer's more frequent contact with autos, however, may
make a certain design more problematic to the dealer than to the consumer. Moreover, in an
appropriate case the plaintiff's causal contribution may reduce his recovery. Most courts and
legislatures have permitted design defect cases to use principles of comparative fault. For a
recent sampling of such pronouncements, see Mutter, Moving to Comparative Negligence in
an Era of Tort Reform: Decisions for Tennessee, 57 TENN. L. REV. 199, 294-303 (1990).

90. This last sentence is included to remove the possibility of a state of the art defense.
See infra notes 113-25 and accompanying text.
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sealed container defense is the impracticability of requiring the kind
of inspection that would reveal the defect, Case 4 does not qualify
for the defense.
Nevertheless, a further analysis of Case 4 is needed. In stating
that the sealed container defense is unavailable to the dealer, we are
assuming that he, like the manufacturer, is aware that placing the
gasoline tank in such proximity to the engine creates a certain risk.
Thus, the dealer can be held liable because the manufacturer has
made a culpable design decision, which the dealer has ratified by
offering the product for sale.
One should then ask whether the statutes, or the courts interpreting them, would be more sympathetic to the supplier if the risk
created by the product were appreciated by the manufacturer, but
not by the supplier. To determine that such a product is in a sealed
container might require inventive use of language. 9 ' If the supplier
has little ability or incentive to discover the defect, he should be able
to. avoid a finding of negligence, at least for the design defect, because he has acted reasonably under the circumstances.9
The case for the supplier is easier in Case 5 than in Case 4, at
least in a sealed container jurisdiction. Yard Palace should be freed
from liability if the court determines that the circumstances of distribution and construction made inspection for the defect difficult or
impossible.
The above analysis also implies that in Cases 3, 4 and 5, if the
supplier does have the benefit of a full-dress negligence defense, it
may be released from liability even though the manufacturer is in
some sense negligent. A court could, however, allow a jury to consider whether the supplier's involvement with a product that the
manufacturer had defectively designed amounts to an independent
act of negligence. 3 For example, Case 3 raises the issue of whether
an auto dealership could be held responsible for purchasing, and
then selling to someone who becomes injured, the "X frame" rather
than "box frame" cars.
Cases 4 and 5 also raise the issue of whether the supplier should
91. On the one hand, the philosophy underpinning the sealed container defense supports
releasing the supplier from liability because a court could not realistically expect the supplier
to expend resources in order to obtain the information necessary to find a defect. On the other
hand, since the sealed container statutes seek to protect those who are unable to inspect, rather
than those who have little incentive to inspect, a court may hold liable a supplier who does not
try to obtain information that leads to a finding of defect.

92.

For a discussion of the possibility that the dealer could incur liability for negligent

dealing, see infra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
93. Cf. Peterson v. Safway Steel Scaffolds Co., 400 N.W.2d 909 (S.D. 1987).
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refuse to deal with a manufacturer whose products incorporate defective designs. But recall the qualification issued in connection with
Case 4: If the supplier does not (and, let us assume, reasonably
should not) understand that the product is deficient, it may be unjust
to cry negligence. Depending upon the relationship between manufacturer and retailer, that same caveat might well apply in any or all
of the hypotheticals discussed in this section.
One factor affecting the decision to impose a duty on the supplier to refuse to deal with manufacturers of defective products is the
type of relationship between supplier and manufacturer. In Peterson
v. Safeway Steel Scaffolds Co.,"4 the South Dakota Supreme Court
suggested that the relationship between manufacturer and down-5
stream commercial entity may justify imposing enterprise liability.'
Peterson involved a suit against the manufacturer and the commercial lessor of parapet clamps by a worker who suffered injuries when
the clamps securing his scaffolding platform detached from the
wall." The injured worker pursued his case under the theory of strict
liability for both design defect and failure to warn against using the
clamps the way plaintiff's coworker had used them. 17 To decide
whether the supplier was liable, the Peterson court had to construe
an oddly worded statute that expressly mixed strict liability and negligence doctrine by limiting actions against suppliers "based on the
doctrine of strict liability in tort" to cases in which the supplier
"knew, or, in the exercise of ordinary care, should have known, of
the defective condition of the final product." 98 The Peterson court
concluded that plaintiff had presented enough evidence to support an
inference that the lessor knew, or should have known, that "the
clamps were in a defective condition" because the supplier provided
no warnings against using them in the manner that caused injury."
Peterson supports the proposition that an intermediary such as a
lessor who decides to deal with a particular manufacturer has a duty
to become acquainted with that manufacturer's product. Furthermore the lessor has a duty either to refrain from leasing a product
94.
95.
96.

400 N.W.2d 909 (S.D. 1987).
Id. at 914.
Id. at 911.

97. The court held that plaintiff had waived the negligence and breach of warranty
claims by not arguing those issues on appeal. Id. at 911-12. Judge Sabers, who partially dis-

sented, criticized the court's waiver of the negligence and breach of warranty claims on the
ground that although plaintiff's brief had emphasized the strict liability theory, plaintiff had
also expressly stated that the theories of negligence and breach of warranty were equally applicable to his claim, Id. at 916 (Sabers, J.,concurring in part and dissenting in part).
98. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-9-9 (1987).
99. Peterson v. Safway Steel Scaffolds Co., 400 N.W.2d 909, 915 (S.D. 1987).
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that he believes to be defectively designed, or to provide a warning to
the ultimate user. 100
Finally, courts in jurisdictions that inculpate suppliers who have
"actual knowledge" of the defect may find them liable even absent a
determination that they have been negligent.10 1 In those jurisdictions, the supplier in Case 3 who knew that he was purchasing defective "X frame" cars would be liable for injuries caused by the defect.
A court might reach that result whether or not the court followed
the approach of finding negligence based upon a supplier's decision
to deal with a defectively designed product. Courts could avoid this
anomalous result either by stressing the legislature's intention to
eliminate liability when the supplier is a "mere conduit," or by holding that knowledge of the auto's construction is not the equivalent of
knowledge, that the car is defective. 02
B. Failure to Warn
1. Claims Against Supplier Based on Negligence Principles.-Claims for defective design and for breach of the duty to
warn are often closely related because the seller may have to give
directions or warning about a product's use in order to prevent the
product from being unreasonably dangerous. 108 Kinship notwithstanding, the failure to provide an adequate warning is judged
against a negligence standard even more so than design defect.104
The Model Uniform Product Liability Act, for example, requires the
trier of fact to make the following findings before a breach of the
duty to warn can be found:
[A]t the time of manufacture, the likelihood that the product
would cause the claimant's harm or similar harms and the seriousness of those harms rendered the manufacturer's instructions
inadequate and . . .the manufacturer should and could have

provided the instructions or warnings which claimant alleges
would have been adequate. 105
100. This interpretation of Peterson is arguably too broad since the lessor in Peterson
had provided a safety manual to plaintiff's employer to accompany previous rentals of the
clamps.
101. See supra note 40.
102. See generally MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACT§ 105 (1979) and accompanying analysis section.
103. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment j (1965).
104. But see supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text, noting that courts sometimes
impose strict liability against "downstream" suppliers when the manufacturer has acted

unreasonably.
105. MODEL

UNIFORM PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACT §

104(C)(1) (1979).

LIABILITY OF NONMANUFACTURING

SELLERS

Because of this close connection between design defect and failure to warn, the analyses offered in Section IVA, supra, would often

apply to warning cases as well. In Peterson, for example, the negligence basis of the supplier liability statute could support a finding
against the "middlemen" under either a design defect or warning
rationale. The court stressed that the plaintiff had presented enough
facts to warrant an inference that the suppliers "knew or should

have known" that the product would be defective without a proper
warning.'

06

Similarly, a court could predicate liability in Case 3 on a
dealer's duty to provide, at minimum, a warning to the consumer
that other cars were more safely designed. Imposing that duty on
dealers would be more feasible for new auto dealers who have an
ongoing relationship with the manufacturer. 07 Even a statute that
requires actual knowledge of the defective condition should not dissuade a court from finding that a dealer has a duty to provide a
warning to consumers that other cars were more safely designed, at
least when knowledge of the defective condition is present. Nonetheless, courts might take the position that the initial duty to warn rests
solely with the manufacturer. 0 8
A more typical case of negligence against the supplier is
presented when the manufacturer has included a warning that the
106. Peterson v. Safway Steel Scaffolds Co., 400 N.W. 2d 909, 915 (S.D. 1987).
107. This case is sympathetic to the argument that retailers are in a position to exert
influence over manufacturers. See, e.g., Bryant v. Hercules Inc., 325 F. Supp. 241 (W.D. Ky.
1970); Reed v. Pennwalt Corp., 22 Wash. App. 718, 591 P.2d 478 (1979). In states that
exculpate suppliers who are without "actual knowledge," a supplier might be liable in Case 6.
Even though a supplier could argue that he had no "actual knowledge" of the defect, his
omission of a warning might rise to the level of reckless behavior. See supra note 69 and
accompanying text.
It should be noted here that there are two broad types of cases involving the duty to warn.
In some cases, the manufacturer has only a duty to convey an adequate warning to a "responsible" intermediary who has a duty to convey the information to plaintiff. Cases involving
prescription drugs are usually held to fall within this category; the pharmaceutical company
need only inform physicians of the drug's dangers. See, e.g., McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical
Corp., 270 Or. 375, 386-87, 528 P.2d 522, 529 (1974). But see MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 394 Mass. 131, 475 N.E.2d 65 (1985) (carving out an exception to the general
rule for birth control pills, owing in part to the limited participation by the physician in a
patient's continuing use of such pills).
Another class of cases, however, imposes upon the manufacturer a duty to take reasonable
steps to convey a warning to the ultimate consumer. Those cases hold that when some act of
negligence on the part of a "downstream" supplier causes the warning not to reach the injured
consumer, the manufacturer is not liable. See, e.g., Bryant v. Hercules Inc., 325 F. Supp. 241
(W.D. Ky. 1970); Reed v. Pennwalt Corp., 22 Wash. App. 718, 591 P.2d 478 (1979).
108. Tort law abounds with instances of judicial refusal to recognize certain duties. The
tortured history of negligent infliction of emotional distress provides an example of the evolution of duty. See generally R. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS, at 1037-63 (5th ed.
1984).
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product holds a danger, but the supplier negligently fails to forward
that warning to the consumer. Courts have consistently imposed liability against a "downstream" defendant for negligent failure to convey a warning that the manufacturer provided. 10 9
Imposing a duty to warn upon the seller in Case 5 would be
difficult under any of the statutes we have considered, because the
seller did not have, and probably could not have, sufficient information upon which to base a warning. But the following discussion
shows that statutory provisions may be necessary to release the supplier from liability.
2. Claims Against Suppliers Based on Strict Liability.-A final illustration will introduce this section:
Case 6. Manufacturer, a large pharmaceutical concern, markets
eye drops that can cause blurred vision in users with a history of
sinus problems. Manufacturer is aware of this side effect, but
the box containing the bottle makes no mention of it, although
other warnings are listed. Drug Store, a retailer, sells the drops
to Consumer, who has a history of sinus problems, and who suffers blurred vision after using the drops.
Absent a statute restricting supplier liability, some courts would
hold Drug Store liable for Consumer's injuries. 110 Although this result is plainly inconsistent with the general negligence basis of the
duty to warn, courts have sometimes held that once the manufacturer is found to have acted unreasonably, such as by failing to warn
or by issuing an inadequate warning, all entities "downstream" will
be liable without regard to fault.'11 Courts are torn between two possibilities. On the one hand, the injured party could be remediless.
Again, this prospect supports imposing strict liability in manufacturing defect cases. On the other hand, the courts realize that, at least
109. Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1962), assumed the liability of
a distributor for issuing an inadequate warning. See Madden, The Duty to Warn in Products
Liability: Contours and Criticism, 89 W. VA. L. REV. 221, 279-85 (1987) (discussing case

law).
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts supports the imposition of strict liability against the supplier in inadequate warning cases. The Restatement provides that liability
attaches against one "who sells any product . . . unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer" although the "seller has exercised all possible care in the . . . sale of his product."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§§ 402A (1965). Based on section 402A, the product could

be "unreasonably dangerous" once the manufacturer has been found negligent. Accordingly,
anyone who sells a negligently manufactured product should be liable without fault even
though he used all possible care.
110. See cases supra note 109.
111. See supra note 109.
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in sealed container cases, suppliers may be in no better position
than
2
the consumer, and are therefore ill-equipped to warn.1
Statutes applicable to these situations may have the salutary effect of making clear the basis of liability. Under any formulation -

sealed container defense, negligence standard, or actual knowledge
-

the Retailer will be free from liability unless other facts sug-

gesting negligence are present. Thus, these statutes eliminate the
current anomalous possibility that manufacturers are not liable unless found negligent, while suppliers who are mere conduits may be

liable without any showing of fault at all.
C. Implications of State of the Art Defense for Statutory Modifications of Supplier Liability
Just as holding a "mere conduit" supplier liable for a manufac-

turer's negligent failure to warn creates a pocket of strict liability in
an otherwise negligence-based theory, so too does at least one view of
the so-called "state of the art" raise the possibility of liability without fault. The defense has many formulations.II When it applies,
the manufacturer can escape strict liability by demonstrating that, at

the time of manufacture, the product, including attendant warnings,
was the best that could be offered given existing scientific knowledge
and reasonable technical feasibility.11 4 In other words, defendant was

not negligent in not creating a safer product. In fact, it is at least
partly because of the availability of this defense that strict liability
112. Madden, supra note 108, at 221. Professor Madden discusses cases that wrestle
with the question of the supplier's knowledge vis-a-vis the consumer.
113. See, e.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-683 (1982 & Supp. 1989). This statute
provides a defense for products conforming to the state of the art, meaning the product was
"in existence and reasonably feasible for use at the time of manufacture." ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 12-681(6) (1982). A fancier variation exists in New Jersey, providing all sellers with a
state of the art defense if, at the time the product left the manufacturer's control, "there was
not a practical and technically feasible alternative design that would have prevented the harm
without substantially impairing the reasonably anticipated or intended function of the product." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-3 (West 1987). The court, however, may defeat this defense
when, "on the basis of clear and convincing evidence," it determines that the product: is "egregiously unsafe or ultra-hazardous"; poses a risk of serious injury to persons other than the user
or consumer; and is of little or no use. Id. § 2A:58c-3(b).
114. As we will see, this formulation is too simple because the term "state of the art"
has not received a uniform definition. As one commentator has stated:
[State of the art] admits to several different meanings. At one end of [the] spectrum . . . is "customary industry practice," the definition most favorable to industry. At the other end . . . is the view that the state of the art is the aggregate
of product-related knowledge existing at any given point in time. An intermediate possibility would limit the state of the art to the aggregate of product-related
knowledge which may feasibly be incorporated into a product.
Note, Product Liability Reform Proposals: The State of the Art Defense, 43 ALBANY L. REv.
941, 945-46 (1979).
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and negligence theories are said to run together in design defect and
warning cases. 115
If the state of the art defense renders strict liability equivalent
to negligence, then statutory provisions restricting the suppliers' liability to situations when they are negligent would apply when the
manufacturer's state of the art defense was successful. Thus, both
the manufacturer and the supplier would be free of liability.

The different formulations of the state of the art defense make
this conclusion premature, however. One formulation of the state of
the art defense relieves defendant of liability when his negligent design conforms to the custom in the relevant industry. 16 A more common variation of the defense relieves defendant from liability when
the product is manufactured to the limits of reasonable scientific or
mechanical -

and perhaps economic -

feasibility and knowl-

edge. 1 7 Finally, some cases have rejected the state of the art defense
altogether, and impose liability even when no one knew, or could
have known at the time of manufacture, that the product posed an
unreasonable risk that could have been eliminated by a different
design.

18

What implications do these different formulations have for supplier liability? The most logical approach would be to tie such liability to whichever formulation of the state of the art defense the jurisdiction has chosen. In jurisdictions in which compliance with
industry custom is a defense, the action against any party in the
chain of distribution would not succeed when the manufacturer successfully establishes the defense. Likewise, in jurisdictions that relieve the manufacturer from liability upon a showing that the product is reasonably feasible, all parties in the chain of distribution
would also be relieved of liability."'
Even if this approach is followed, problems arise if the state of
the art defense is disallowed. Since such a position essentially
charges a supplier or manufacturer "with hindsight,"' 20 there is no
115. See M. SHAPO, THE LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 1 10.02 [3][a] (1988 Supp.).
116. Kentucky essentially takes this approach except that the defendant is given only a
rebuttable presumption of no liability when the design conforms "to the generally recognized
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.310 (2)
and prevailing standards or the state of the art .
(Baldwin 1988).
117. See MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACT § 107(E) (1979).
118. See Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982).
119. The supplier may have engaged in some further conduct, such as the granting of an
express warranty, that will render him liable. Nevertheless, the issue is whether a supplier who
is a mere conduit will be liable when the "upstream" manufacturer is successfully able to
maintain a state of the art defense.
120. C & S Fuel, Inc. v. Clark Equipment Co., 552 F. Supp. 340, 343 (E.D. Ky. 1982).
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negligence with which to equate a defective design. In Pennsylvania,
for example, a host of decisions dating back to Azzarello v. Black
Brothers Co. 2 ' indicates a less than receptive view toward any variation of the state of the art defense. But perhaps the most celebrated
example of justicial rejection of a "pure" state of the art defense
came in Beshada v. Johns-Mansville Products Corp.122
In Beshada, the defendant, an asbestos manufacturer, argued
for the opportunity to demonstrate that the danger posed by its product "was undiscovered at the time the product was marketed and
that it was undiscoverable given the state of scientific knowledge at
'
that time."128
The court, stressing the risk-spreading and accident
avoidance goals impelling strict products liability, rejected the state
of the art defense. The Court stated that risk spreading works
equally well for unknown and unknowable risks, and that "imposing
on manufacturers the costs of failure to discover hazards, [creates]
an incentive for them to invest more actively in safety research."' 24
Although few courts have followed Beshada, and the case has
been much criticized, 2 5 the possibility that design defects can be uncoupled from a negligence standard suggests that reform statutes exculpating non-negligent suppliers could yield disparate results for
manufacturers and suppliers. Manufacturers, though wholly nonnegligent, could still be liable, but suppliers would not be liable.
Moreover, suppliers should also be able to escape liability under either a sealed container or actual knowledge theory, since the supplier
has neither imputed nor actual knowledge of the defect.
V.

Conclusion

Concern over the rising cost of product liability actions has
driven state legislatures to enact "reform" statutes, a euphemism for
legislation that often restricts an injured party's ability to recover.
One unusually fertile area for change has been the liability of nonmanufacturing suppliers, perhaps because of the consistent recognition that nonmanufacturing suppliers are often mere conduits entitled to indemnification against the manufacturer in any event.' 26
121. 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1978).
122. 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982).
123. Id. at 196, 447 A.2d at 542.
124. Id. at 207, 447 A.2d at 548.
125. The New Jersey Supreme Court has "restrict[ed] Beshada to the circumstances
giving rise to its holding." Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429, 455, 479 A.2d 374,
388 (1984). Feldman also cites many of the commentaries critical of the Beshada holding. Id.
126. Recall that in all but a few jurisdictions, the supplier will be "transformed" into a
manufacturer when the plaintiff is unable to recover against the manufacturer. See supra note
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These statutes restricting supplier liability are richly varied in
terms of both the substantive liability requirements they announce
and the relationship they bear to other provisions, such as contribution, indemnity, and joint and several liability. Focusing on the sections affecting the kind of conduct for which suppliers are sanctioned, this Article has considered the implications of these new
liability rules across the spectrum of product liability claims. The
aim has been to demonstrate that, although the sections will affect a
great number of cases, rarely will their impact be a simple matter to
predict. Much depends, of course, on the particular statutory provisions. But just as much may hinge on judicial predilection: Will negligence receive a modified definition under these statutes? How
broadly will courts read the "sealed container" defense? Will the
"actual knowledge" requirement of a few states be taken seriously?
These questions are only now beginning to be asked. The future
of supplier liability statutes may well depend on public taste for the
answers yet to be provided.

3 and accompanying text.

